

VZCZCXRO3103
PP RUEH DU RUEH GI RUEH JO RUEH MA RUEH MR RUEH PA RUEH RO V
DE RUEH DS #1568/01 1600711
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 090711Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 6926
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0992
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEH TH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 0057
RUEH BJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0415
RUEH SL/AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA PRIORITY 0017
RUEH CP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 0412
RUEH KI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY 0380
RUEH PE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 0060
RUEH LO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 2815
RUEH FR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1716

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 001568

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/SPG, IO/PSC, D:T.SMITH

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [PREL](#) [MOPS](#) [KPKO](#) [SU](#) [AU](#) [UN](#)

SUBJECT: UNSC MISSION REPORTS TO AU THAT SUDAN HAS NOT
APPROVED UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATION

¶1. (SBU). SUMMARY. On June 7, the visiting UN Security Council delegation visiting Addis Ababa, Chad, and Sudan, briefed representatives of the 15-member African Union Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) and AU partners (i.e., non-member states) on its June 6 meetings in Khartoum with Sudanese President Bashir, parliamentarians, opposition parties, and NGOs. UNSC PermReps outlined continued Sudanese reservations about an UN operation, including a Chapter VII mandate under the UN Charter, but stressed the necessity of continued engagement. France and China underscored the need for the consent of the Government of Sudan before a UN operation could be deployed. Speakers hailed the June 7 meeting as the first ever between the UN Security Council and the three-year-old AU Peace and Security Council. END SUMMARY.

NEXT STEPS: STRENGTHENING AMIS AND TRANSITION TO UN

¶2. (SBU) According to UKUN PermRep Sir Emyr Jones Parry, while the UNSC mission urged both Sudan's Government of National Unity (GNU) and other parties to comply with commitments "on the UN taking over AMIS II" (i.e., the enhanced African Union Mission in Sudan), "we did not get agreement on that transfer, nor did we expect to get that." The UN was "further forward, but not there yet." On the other hand, the UNSC did receive confirmation that a joint UN-AU technical assessment mission would be permitted to visit Darfur and Khartoum, beginning June 9. Such a mission was crucial, not only for strengthening AMIS, but also for developing its new mandate. While a transfer was "probable," the UNSC had not expected to obtain the GNU's full approval, he said.

¶3. (SBU) Jones Parry underscored the necessity to strengthen AMIS, and to provide it with the resources necessary to fulfill an enhanced mandate that included the protection of civilians, rather than focusing only on monitoring. As five to eight additional battalions required training, equipment, transportation, and sustenance, there was a risk the international community was not taking sufficient steps soon enough; even President Bashir has stressed the urgency of action, he said. Jones Parry highlighted the need for

adequate security as AMIS draws down and the UN builds up. He also recommended that the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO) develop two concepts of operations: one for the transition of AMIS to a UN-led mission, and another for the UN operation itself.

¶4. (SBU) Jones Parry outlined a roadmap for transition, which he said was shared by both the UNSC and the AU Commission, and would be discussed with UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Guehenno:

- continued implementation of current AMIS operations;
- agreement on a new concept of operations (CONOPS), based on the May 5 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), placing greater emphasis on protection of civilians;
- AMIS securing personnel and resources for AMIS expansion (which would require bilateral aid and a pledging conference before July);
- identification by the assessment mission of the scope for transition;
- production by UN DPKO of a CONOPS for the UN mission, for consideration by the UNSC;
- identification of troop contributing countries for the UN mission, "with a strong African character;"
- transition to the UN, with full operational capacity likely not to occur until January 2007.

Jones Parry noted that these steps needed to be done with the consent of Sudan.

SUDANESE CONCERNS ABOUT UN, CHAPTER VII, AND CHAD

¶5. (SBU) Peru UN PermRep De Rivero observed that Sudanese

ADDIS ABAB 00001568 002 OF 003

parliamentarians, with whom the mission had met, expressed dissatisfaction with the prospect of a UN force coming to Sudan. The UNSC representatives sought to defend UNSCR 1679's references to a UN operation in Darfur operating under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and to explain that the UN's threats to use force were directed against armed groups, rather than Sudan, a UN member state. "They are not too convinced about that," he remarked, adding that the UN required a strong mandate to protect civilians and comply with the DPA. Greek UN PermRep Vassilakis questioned whether President Bashir "has the necessary support from inside" to accept a Chapter VII UN operation. Argentina PermRep Mayoral said the view of parliamentarians was clearer than that of central government officials, but noted that parliament included representatives of the north and south, but not of Darfur.

¶6. (SBU) Danish UN PermRep Andersen noted that President Bashir sought to blame the Government of Chad, while exonerating the GNU. According to Andersen, Bashir said that the Janjaweed was only "partially" a Sudanese problem, as 40 per cent of the Janjaweed came from Chad. By focusing on the technical nature of the joint UN-AU assessment mission, the GNU sought to depoliticize issues too sensitive to handle otherwise, Andersen said. He noted that the GNU was now pursuing a "negotiations strategy" with the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in southern Sudan, and had asked Uganda to mediate.

¶7. (SBU) Slovak UN PermRep Burian said that Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) ministers had cited "many failures" along with many successes, particularly the failure of donors to deliver on pledges made in Oslo for the reconstruction of the south. They also called for greater attention to be paid to the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), between north and south, not just the DPA. The LRA posed a serious problem for southern Sudan, he said, and was reportedly recruiting as well as targeting internally displaced persons.

¶8. (SBU) Asked about future steps the AU might take, Congo UN

PermRep Biabaroh-Iboro observed that while AMIS transition to the UN would be on the agenda of the upcoming July 1-2 AU Summit in Banjul, the AU would likely await conclusions of the UN-AU joint assessment mission. AU Commission Chairperson Konare would travel to Sudan, he said; furthermore, a committee of African heads of state, as noted in the March 10 AU PSC decision, could go to Khartoum to meet with President Bashir. Biabaroh-Iboro said the UNSC and the AU could coordinate quickly with each other, citing the May 16 UNSCR, which immediately followed the May 15 AU PSC decision.

¶9. (SBU) In response to Greek Ambassador to Ethiopia's observation that public outreach activities were needed to reach civil society in Darfur, Greek UN PermRep Vassilakis agreed that the AU and UNMIS could develop and disseminate information materials, but not the UNSC itself.

¶10. (SBU) Responding to Norwegian Charge's inquiry about whether the UN could intervene earlier to strengthen AMIS, French UN PermRep De La Sabliere expressed skepticism, noting that intervention required sufficient preparation. In an emergency, a single nation state could intervene, he said, citing France's intervention in Bunia in the Democratic Republic of Congo, under UNSC auspices. While the period prior to the deployment of UN forces needed to be as short as possible, UN forces could not be deployed without Sudan's consent; the UN needed to develop a mandate that protected civilians, in consultation with Sudanese authorities, he said.

¶11. (SBU) Jones-Parry said difficulties with simultaneously deploying AU and UN troops include concerns about conflicting command and control, headquarters, lack of parity of pay and financing, and the dearth of troop contributing countries.

¶12. (SBU) Chinese UN PermRep Wang concluded the presentation by UNSC members by remarking that UNSC members had different views of the causes and situation of conflict in Darfur, but

ADDIS ABAB 00001568 003 OF 003

should unite behind the Abuja talks "to help Africans help Sudanese help themselves." Ongoing discussions between the Sudan and the UN had developed trust, he said; "our common objective is peace." Wang called for continued support for strengthening AMIS over the next few months, and asserted that continued engagement by partners could lead to Sudan's approval of a UN operation. "The door for the UN taking over is open; the (UNSC) mission has not closed the door."
HUDDLESTON